Quantum key distribution allows two parties, traditionally known as Alice and Bob, to establish a secure random cryptographic key if, firstly, they have access to a quantum communication channel, and secondly, they can exchange classical public messages which can be monitored but not altered by an eavesdropper, Eve. Quantum key distribution provides perfect security because, unlike its classical counterpart, it relies on the laws of physics rather than on ensuring that successful eavesdropping would require excessive computational effort. However, security proofs of quantum key distribution are not trivial and are usually restricted in their applicability to specific protocols. In contrast, we present a general and conceptually simple proof which can be applied to a number of different protocols. It relies on the fact that a cryptographic procedure called privacy amplification is equally secure when an adversary's memory for data storage is quantum rather than classical [1] .
Introduction
The potential power of quantum phenomena to protect information was first adumbrated by Wiesner who, in the early 1970's, introduced the concept of quantum conjugate coding. He showed how to store or transmit two messages by encoding them in two conjugate observables, such as linear and circular polarization of light, so that either but not both of may be received and decoded. He illustrated his idea with a design of unforgeable bank notes [2] . Building upon this work, Bennett and Brassard proposed a quantum key distribution scheme, known as BB84 or the four state protocol, in which Alice repeatedly sends to Bob one of four prescribed states of a qubit, and Bob measures them in one of two conjugate bases [3] . Independently and initially unaware of the earlier work, Ekert developed a different approach to quantum cryptography based on quantum entanglement. He proposed a key distribution protocol, known as E91, in which entangled pairs of qubits are distributed to Alice and Bob, who then extract key bits by measuring their qubits in prescribed bases [4] . A particularly nice feature of E91, for the purpose of security analysis, is that Eve herself is allowed to prepare and deliver all the qubit pairs that Alice and Bob will subsequently use to generate the key.
Many variations on quantum key distribution have been subsequently proposed and we will mention some of them later on. They can be roughly divided into "prepare and measure" protocols, such as BB84, and "entanglement based" protocols, such as E91. Many interesting techniques for manipulating quantum entanglement have been discovered in the last few years. Thus it is often convenient to cast some of the "prepare and measure" protocols in terms of the "entanglement based" ones.
Security Proofs
All good quantum key distribution protocols must be operable in the presence of noise that may or may not result from eavesdropping. The protocols must specify for which values of measurable parameters Alice and Bob can establish a secret key and provide a physically implementable procedure which generates such a key. The design of the procedure must take into account that an eavesdropper may have access to unlimited quantum computing power. On Alice and Bob's side, the procedure should rely on simple and easily implementable operations. For example, good protocols should not assume that Alice and Bob have quantum computers, or any sophisticated quantum technology, apart from the ability to transmit over a quantum channel.
The search for operational security criteria led to early studies of quantum eavesdropping [5, 6] and finally to the first proof of the security of key distribution [7] . The original proof showed that the E91 and all entanglement based key distributions are indeed secure and noise-tolerant against an adversary with unlimited computing power as long as Alice and Bob can implement quantum privacy amplification. Quantum privacy amplification allows one to establish a secure key over any distance, e.g. using entanglement swapping [8] in a chain of quantum repeaters [9, 10] . However, this procedure, which distils pure entangled states from corrupted mixed states of two qubits, requires a small scale quantum computation. Subsequent proofs by Inamori [11] and Ben-Or [12] showed that Alice and Bob can also distill a secret key from partially entangled particles using only classical error correction and classical privacy amplification [13, 14] .
Quantum privacy amplification was also used by Lo and Chau to prove the security of the BB84 protocol over an arbitrary distance [15] . A concurrent and independent proof by Mayers showed that the protocol can be secure without Alice and Bob having to rely on the use of quantum computers [16] . The same conclusion, but using different techniques, was subsequently reached by Biham et al. [17] . Although the two proofs did not require quantum privacy amplification they were rather complex. A nice fusion of quantum privacy amplification and error correction was proposed by Shor and Preskill who formulated a relatively simple proof of the security of the BB84 protocol based on virtual quantum error correction [18] . They showed that a protocol which employs quantum error-correcting codes to prevent Eve from becoming entangled with qubits that are used to generate the key reduces to the BB84 augmented by classical error correction and classical privacy amplification. This proof has been further extended by Gottesman and Lo [19] to cover the case of two-way public communication in BB84 which allows a higher bit error rate, and by Tamaki et al. [20] to prove the security of the B92 protocol. More recently another simple proof of the security of BB84, which employs results from quantum communication complexity, has been provided by Ben-Or [12].
Do we need another security proof?
Most popular quantum key distribution schemes have been analyzed in terms of their security criteria and there is a pretty good understanding of the limitations of the techniques involved e.g. those due to imperfect sources or detectors. The schemes vary but every single one of them must involve either quantum or classical privacy amplification as an inherent part of the secure key distillation protocol.
Classical privacy amplification, originally proposed by Bennett, Brassard and Robert, was restricted to the case in which Eve acquires classical, deterministic information about the key [13] . The applicability of the method was then extended by Bennett, Brassard, Crépeau and Maurer to cover sce-narios where Eve's information is classical and probabilistic [14] . We use the recent result by König, Maurer and Renner on the power of quantum memory [1] in a quantum cryptographic context. It can be then viewed as a further generalization of classical privacy amplification to cases in which Eve's information about the key is quantum. Of course, the privacy amplification is useless unless we can estimate an upper bound on the amount of quantum information available to Eve. We show how to do this for the common quantum key distribution protocols. Taken together these results together these results give a very general and powerful technique for assessing security of any quantum key distribution protocol.
Scenario
In our scenario Eve has a technological advantage over Alice and Bob. She can distribute qubits to Alice and Bob, she can entangle the qubits with an ancilla that she controls, she can have access to unlimited quantum computational power, she can monitor all the public communication between Alice and Bob in which they reveal their measurement choices and exchange further information in order to correct errors in their shared key and to amplify its privacy. In contrast Alice and Bob can only perform measurements on individual qubits and communicate classically over a public channel. We will assess the security in the case of a noisy quantum channel without losses.
Alice and Bob go through prescribed stages of quantum key distribution and at some point they end up with perfectly correlated binary strings about which Eve has some information, namely all information communicated in public together with all information contained in her ancilla. The ancilla is a quantum entity which Eve may measure at the very end of the key distribution protocol. Hence its information content has to be expressed in qubits rather than bits. Classical privacy amplification allows Alice and Bob to increase the privacy of the shared string as long as they can estimate the amount of classical information that leaked to Eve [13] . For any shared string of n bits upon which Eve has some r bits of information the procedure outputs a binary string of length s shorter than n − r and such that Eve has virtually no information about the new string. The snag is that Eve, who can delay her measurement of the ancilla, has r qubits rather than r bits of information about the n bit string. We show that, at least in this particular context, it does not matter. We show how Alice and Bob are able to estimate the quantum information content of r qubits in Eve's ancilla in a generic quantum key distribution protocol. They are then in the position to apply classical privacy amplification as if Eve had acquired r bits rather than r qubits of information about the key [1] .
Outline of the main result
It is convenient for the purpose of this outline to start with a generic scenario in which Eve distributes quantum particles to Alice and Bob. Without any loss of generality we assume that Eve starts with a tripartite pure state describing a batch of particles delivered to Alice, a batch of particles delivered to Bob, and an ancilla which is retained by Eve.
When Alice and Bob receive their respective particles they perform measurements following a quantum key distribution protocol which they agreed in advance. For example, they may measure every single particle choosing randomly from a prescribed set of different measurements. They also communicate in public and agree which outcomes of the measurements are to be discarded and which will be used for the key generation.
At this point Alice and Bob have partially correlated n bit strings labeled, respectively, as X and Y . Eve knows the protocol and holds an ancilla which was entangled with the qubits prior to Alice's and Bob's measurements. After the measurements the ancilla is in a quantum state which, in general, depends on X and Y and is described by some density operator ρ E . The initial public communication must allow Alice and Bob to estimate the degree of the correlation between X and Y and the upper bound on the quantum information content of the ancilla in state ρ E . This is not trivial as we do not assume that the pairs of qubits are independent and identically distributed; they can be entangled between themselves and the ancilla in an arbitrary way. We shall elaborate on this point later on.
Let the degree of correlations be quantified by the mutual information I(X; Y ) and let the quantum information content of the ancilla be no more than r qubits. The two strings X and Y can be made identical by the information reconciliation procedure. Alice has to communicate in public approximately H(X|Y ) (the conditional entropy of X given Y ) bits about X so that Bob, who knows Y , can guess X correctly. This follows from the fact that H(X|Y ) + I(X; Y ) = H(X), where H(X) ≤ n is the a priori entropy of X.
Thus, after the information reconciliation, Eve's information about X consists of H(X|Y ) classical bits and r qubits. Without any loss of generality we can assume that Eve's information is contained in H(X|Y )+r qubits. Eve can wait and perform her measurement on the ancilla whenever she sees fit. However, no matter which observable she measures after the classical privacy amplification she is not better off than she would be if she had H(X|Y ) + r classical bits of information about X prior to the privacy amplification. This follows from the recent work by König, Maurer, and Renner on the power of quantum memory. [1] We will elaborate on this in more detail in the next section. Thus the length of the secret key after the privacy amplification is H(X) − H(X|Y ) − r = I(X; Y ) − r, i.e. the key can be established when I(X; Y ) > r. Moreover the key rate R is
(see section 4.4.3) Let us consider the particular case of independent and identically distributed pairs of qubits. Each pair that Eve delivers to Alice and Bob comes from a tripartite pure state |Ψ such that ρ = tr E |Ψ Ψ| is the density operator of each qubit pair and ρ E = tr AB |Ψ Ψ| is the density operator of a part of the ancilla. The state of the ancilla in an n-fold tensor product of the form ρ E = ρ e ⊗ ρ e ... ⊗ ρ e . In this particular case we can use the quantum coding results [21, 22] to estimate r in the limit of large n; r = nS(ρ e ) = nS(ρ) qubits, where S(ρ) is the von Neumann entropy of ρ; S(ρ) = −tr(ρ log ρ). The mutual information can be written as I(X; Y ) = n(1 − h(ǫ)), where h(ǫ) = −ǫ log ǫ − (1 − ǫ) log(1 − ǫ) and ǫ is the average bit error rate. The threshold error rate can be then established from the condition
A key distribution protocol should allow Alice and Bob to estimate the purity of the qubit pairs S(ρ). If not they need to maximize S(ρ) over all possible density operators ρ which are consistent with the estimated bit error rate ǫ.
The argument above relies on the extension of the applicability of classical privacy amplification to the cases where Eve has partial quantum rather than partial classical information about the key. This follows from a more general observation that encoding classical information into qubits rather than bits, although never worse, does not offer any significant advantage in some scenarios; ours being one of them. Amazingly enough potential advantages of quantum encoding were already pointed out by Wiesner in his seminal paper on conjugate coding [2] . Subsequently Ambainis, Nayak, TaShma and Vazirani [23] considered a scenario where one has to use partial information about a binary string X to answer a random binary question about X. One might think that storing partial information about X in a quantum rather than classical memory has a natural advantage because one can delay a measurement on the quantum memory until after the question has been asked. This gives an extra freedom of choosing the most appropriate measurement. However, Ambainis et al. [23] and Nayak [24] showed that if information about a n bit string X is stored in r qubits and one is asked about a particular bit value of X then in order to err with probability ǫ one needs r > n h(ǫ). Thus, asymptotically, in this particular case, quantum storage does not offer any advantage. König, Maurer and Renner [1] show that there is no advantage even if one is asked more general, nonbinary, questions. This made it possible to make the connection to privacy amplification.
In the following we provide a detailed and reasonably self-contained description of the new security proof. In Section 3 we introduce the relevant concepts and methods of probability theory and quantum mechanics. The main results are presented in Section 4. This is followed by applications of our security criteria to selected quantum key distribution protocols.
Preliminaries

Notation
Let a be a subset of a set I. The characteristic function χ a of a on I is the function from I to {0, 1} defined by χ(i) = 1 if and only if i ∈ a.
Let z = (z 1 , . . . , z n ) be an n-tuple and a ⊆ {1, . . . , n} a set of indices. Then z a denotes the |a|-tuple containing all z i with i ∈ a. For two n-tuples z = (z 1 , . . . , z n ) and
where a k and b k are the sets containing the indices of the k largest elements of z and z ′ , respectively. A real valued function f on the set of real n-tuples is said to be Schur-convex if
for any z and z ′ . For a function f on Z, we denote by f max and f min the functions on the power set of Z defined by
for any Z ′ ⊆ Z. Let δ : Z × Z → R + be a metric on a set Z. The ε-environment of an element z ∈ Z is defined by
Similarly, the ε-environment of a subset Z ′ ⊆ Z is the union of all ε-environments of elements of Z ′ , i.e.,
Elements of Probability Theory
In the following, we use capital letters (Z) for random variables, calligraphic letters (Z) for their range, and small letters (z) for the elements of their range. The probability distribution of a random variable Z is denoted by
A random variable or probability distribution is called binary if it has range Z = {0, 1}. We write P bin p for the binary probability distribution with P bin p (1) = p. An n-tuple (Z 1 , . . . , Z n ) of random variables with the same range Z is called exchangeable if, for all permutations π on {1, . . . , n},
It is easy to see that, for any n-tuple (Z 1 , . . . , Z n ) of random variables with range Z, the n-tuple
obtained by permuting the indices according to a random permutation Π on {1, . . . , n} is exchangeable.
The variational distance between two probability distributions P and Q over the same range Z is defined by
The variational distance δ is a metric on the set of probability distributions with range Z. In particular, δ(P, Q) = 0 if and only if P = Q, it is symmetric, and it satisfies the triangle inequality. For random variables Z and Z ′ , we also write δ(Z, Z ′ ) instead of δ(P Z , P Z ′ ). The variational distance between two probability distributions P and Q can be interpreted as the probability that two random experiments described by P and Q, respectively, are different. This is formalized by the following lemma.
Lemma 3.1. Let P and Q be two probability distributions. Then there exists a pair of random variables Z and Z ′ with joint probability distribution P ZZ ′ such that P Z = P , P Z ′ = Q, and
It is easy to see that the variational distance between Z and Z ′ can not increase when applying the same function f on both Z and Z ′ , i.e.,
Let [Z, W ] and [Z ′ , W ′ ] be two pairs of random variables, and let P Z|W (·, w) := P Z|W =w and P Z ′ |W ′ (·, w) := P Z ′ |W ′ =w be the probability distribution of Z and Z ′ conditioned on W = w and W ′ = w, respectively. Using the triangle inequality, it can be shown that
Combining this with (3) for the function f : (z, w) → w leads to
and, similarly, for f : (z, w) → z,
Let P be a probability distribution over Z. The non-uniformity of P ,
is defined as the variational distance of P from the uniform distribution U over Z. For a random variable Z with probability distribution P Z , we also write d(Z) instead of d(P Z ). Similarly, for two random variables Z and W , the expected non-uniformity of Z given W is defined by
Definition 3.2. Let z := (z 1 , . . . , z n ) be an n-tuple of elements from a set Z. The frequency distribution Q z of z is the real valued function on Z defined by
It is easy to see that the frequency Q z is a probability distribution on Z, i.e., Q z (z) ∈ [0, 1] and z∈Z Q z (z) = 1. Definition 3.3. The probability range of an n-tuple Z = (Z 1 , . . . , Z n ) of random variables with range Z is the smallest convex set P of probability distributions on Z such that
for all k ∈ {1, . . . , n} and z 1 , . . . , z n−1 ∈ Z.
The following lemma states that the frequency distribution of a sequence of random variables is with high probability contained in an ε-environment of its probability range.
Lemma 3.4. Let Z = (Z 1 , . . . , Z n ) be an n-tuple of random variables with alphabet Z of size |Z| = q and let P be the probability range of Z. Then, for any ε > 0,
We will make use of different entropy measures to characterize random variables or, more precisely, their probability distributions. Let P be a probability distribution with range Z, support Z + := {z ∈ Z : P (z) > 0}, and maximum probability p max (P ) := max z∈Z P (z). Then, the Rényi entropy of order α, for α ∈ R + ∪ {∞}, 1 is defined by 2
It turns out that, for α = 1, H 1 (P ) corresponds to the Shannon entropy H(P ) = − z∈Z + P (z) log(P (z)). Moreover, for α = ∞, we have H ∞ (P ) = − log(p max ), which is also called min-entropy, and, for α = 0, H 0 (P ) = log(|Z + |). For a random variable Z with probability distribution P Z , we also write H(Z) instead of H(P Z ), and, more generally, for an event E, H(Z|E) instead of H(P Z|E ). The Rényi entropy of order α of a random variable Z conditioned on another random variable W is given by
and
We will often be interested in the entropy of a probability distribution which is close to a given distribution P . This is formalized by the notion of smooth Rényi entropy.
Definition 3.5. Let ε ≥ 0 and α ∈ R + ∪ {∞}. The ε-smooth Rényi entropy or order α of a probability distribution P is defined by
Similarly, the notion of conditional Rényi entropy can be generalized to smooth Rényi entropy. In particular, for α = ∞, we have
The following lemma is an immediate consequence of this definition for α = 0.
Lemma 3.6. Let Z be a random variable with range Z and let Z ′ be a subset of Z. Then, for any ε ≥ 0,
For α = 0, the (smooth) Rényi entropy is sub-additive.
Lemma 3.7. Let Z and W be two random variables. Then, for any ε, ε ′ > 0,
The min-entropy of a random variable Z when conditioning on another random variable W cannot decrease more than the Rényi entropy of order zero of W . Lemma 3.8. Let Z and W be random variables. Then, for any ε, ε ′ , ε ′′ ∈ R + ,
Lemma 3.9. Let Z be an exchangeable n-tuple of random variables with range Z. Then
Proof. Use Stirling's approximation:
The notion of typical sets is widely used in information theory. For an overview, we refer to the standard literature (e.g., [25] ). Note that the following definition of typical sets is slightly different from the one given in [25] . Definition 3.10. Let Z be a set, n ∈ N, and r ≥ 0. The r-typical set over Z n is defined as T n Z (r) := {z ∈ Z n : H(Q z ) ≤ r} .
Lemma 3.11. For any set Z of size |Z| = q, n, ∈ N, and r ≥ 0,
Proof. Let Q := {Q z : z ∈ Z n } be the set of frequency distributions of n-tuples over Z and, for anyQ ∈ Q, let S(Q) := {z ∈ Z n : Q z =Q} be the set of n-tuples z = (z 1 , . . . , z n ) with frequency distributionQ. We first show that, for anyQ ∈ Q,
Let Z = (Z 1 , . . . , Z n ) be an n-tuple of independent random variables Z i distributed according toQ. Since, for any n-tuple z in S(Q), each symbol z occurs nQ(z) times in z, we find which implies (7) . The assertion of the lemma then follows from
and the observation that |Q| ≤ n q−1 .
Definition 3.12. Let p ∈ [0, 1] and let I be a set. The p-random selection A on I is the random variable describing the subset obtained by independently picking each element of I with probability p, i.e., for any a ⊆ I,
where χ a be the characteristic function of a on I.
|Y| holds for any distinct x, x ′ ∈ X . In particular, G is twouniversal if, for any distinct x, x ′ ∈ X , the random variables G(x) and G(x ′ ) are independent and uniformly distributed. For instance, the uniform random function from a set X to a set Y is two-universal. 3 
Elements of Quantum Theory
Let H be a Hilbert space of dimension d. We denote by S(H) the set of density operators on H, i.e., S(H) is the set of positive operators ρ on H with tr(ρ) = 1. For any ρ ∈ S(H), let λ(ρ) be the d-tuple of eigenvalues of ρ (e.g., in decreasing order). The trace distance between two density operators ρ and sigma on the same Hilbert space H is defined by δ(ρ, σ) := 1 2 tr(|ρ − σ|) .
We will use several well-known properties of the trace distance. For proofs, we refer to the standard literature (e.g., [28] ). The trace distance can be seen as a generalization of the variational distance to density operators. Many of the properties of the variational distance thus also hold for the trace distance. In particular, the trace distance is a metric on S(H).
Moreover, for two probability distributions P and Q over W and two families of density operators {ρ w } w∈W and {σ w } w∈W ,
This inequality can be seen as the quantum analogue of (6) . The trace distance between two pure states ρ = |φ φ| and σ = |ψ ψ| can easily be computed explicitly,
Let F be a positive operator valued measure (POVM) on a Hilbert space H, i.e., F = {F z } z∈Z is a family of positive operators on H such that z∈Z F z = id. We say that F is orthogonal if there exists an orthonormal basis {|z } z∈Z of H such that F z = |z z|, for any z ∈ Z. Definition 3.13. Let F = {F z } z∈Z be a POVM on a Hilbert space H. The measurement mapping γ F of F is the function mapping each density operator ρ ∈ S(H) to the probability distribution P = γ F (ρ) on Z defined by P (z) := tr(F z ρ). The probability range P F of F is the range of γ F , i.e., P F := γ(S(H)).
For a POVM F = {F z } z∈Z on a Hilbert space H and a probability distribution P on Z, we write γ −1 F (P ) to denote the set of density operators ρ on H such that γ F (ρ) = P . More generally, for a set P of probability distributions, γ −1 F (P) := P ∈P γ −1 F (P ) is the set of density operators ρ with γ F (ρ) ∈ P Let H be a Hilbert space, let ρ ∈ S(H ⊗n ), let a ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, and let F = {F z } z∈Z be a POVM on H. Then Γ a F (ρ) denotes the |a|-tupleẐ of outcomes resulting from applying the measurement F to each factor space H i , for i ∈ a.
The trace distance between two density operators ρ and σ turns out to be an upper bound for the variational distance between the probability distributions of the outcomes of the same measurement F applied to ρ and σ.
Lemma 3.14. Let F be a POVM on a Hilbert space H and let ρ, σ ∈ S(H).
The probability distribution resulting from an orthogonal measurement of a quantum state ρ is in a certain sense less ordered than the eigenvalues of ρ. This is formalized by the following lemma. A proof can, for instance, be found in [29] (see also [30] ).
Lemma 3.15 (Schur's majorization theorem). Let F = {F 1 , . . . , F d } be an orthogonal measurement on a d-dimensional Hilbert space. Then, for any density operator ρ ∈ S(H),
where p = (γ F (ρ)(1), . . . , γ F (ρ)(d)) are the probabilities of the outcomes when measuring ρ with respect to F.
Let H ⊗ H ′ be a bipartite Hilbert space, let ρ ∈ S(H ⊗ H ′ ), and let Z be the outcome of a measurement of ρ with respect to a POVM F = {F z } z∈Z on (a subspace of) H ′ . The density operator of the system H conditioned on Z = z, denoted ρ H z←F , is given by
where c := tr(id ⊗ F z ρ) is a normalization constant and where tr H ′ denotes the partial trace over the subspace H ′ . Let H ⊗n := H 1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ H n be the product of n identical factor spaces H i = H. The following definition can be seen as a quantum version of Definition 3.3.
Definition 3.16. The density range of a density operator ρ ∈ H ⊗n is the smallest convex subset P of S(H) such that for any k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, for any POVM F = {F z } z∈Z on H ′ := k−1 i=1 , and for any z ∈ Z, the density operator ρ H k z←F is contained in P. Let E be a quantum operation E on a Hilbert space H, i.e., E = {E z } z∈Z is a family of linear operators E z on H such that z∈Z E † z E z = id. Then, the density operator σ = E(ρ) resulting from applying E to a density operator ρ is given by
Lemma 3.17. Let ρ be a density operator on H and let σ := E(ρ) be the density operator resulting from applying a quantum operation E = {E z } z∈Z to ρ. Then
Proof. We first show that the assertion of the lemma holds if ρ = |φ φ| is a pure state. For z ∈ Z, let p z := tr(E z ρE † z ), |ψ z := 1 √ pz E z |φ , and σ z := |ψ z ψ z |. Note that p z ∈ [0, 1], z p z = 1, and
We can thus apply (8) yielding
Since, ρ = |φ φ| and σ z = |ψ z ψ z | are pure states, it follows from 9) that
Combining this with (10), we find and applying Jensen's inequality, we find
where the second inequality follows from the concavity of the square root and Jensen's inequality. This concludes the proof of the lemma for pure states ρ.
To verify that the assertion of the lemma also holds for mixed states ρ, write ρ as a convex combination of pure states ρ w , i.e., ρ = w∈W q w ρ w for appropriate q w ∈ [0, 1] with w∈W q w = 1, and let E(ρ w ) be the state resulting from applying the quantum operation E on ρ w . Then, since σ = E(ρ) = w∈W q w E(ρ w ), inequality (8) yields
where the last inequality follows from the statement of the lemma applied to the pure states ρ w . Using again Jensen's inequality, we obtain
which concludes the proof. Lemma 3.14 provides an upper bound on the variational distance between the probability distributions of the outcomes lower bound on the distance between
We will now use Lemma 3.17 to derive a lower bound for the variational distance between two probability distributions in terms of the trace distance between two corresponding density operators. This is in a certain sense the converse of Lemma 3.14.
Lemma 3.18. Let F = {F z } z∈Z be an orthogonal POVM on a Hilbert space H, let ρ ∈ S(H), let P := γ F (ρ), and let Q be a probability distribution on Z. Then there exists σ ∈ S(H) such that
In particular,
Proof. From Lemma 3.1, there exist random variables Z and Z ′ distributed according to P and Q, respectively, such that
, and let {|z } z∈Z be an orthonormal basis of H such that F z = |z z|. Let
be linear operators on H. It is easy to verify that the family E = {E 0 } ∪ {E z,z ′ } (z,z ′ )∈W is a quantum operation, i.e.,
be the quantum state resulting from applying E to ρ. It then follows from a straightforward calculation that γ F (σ) = P Z ′ which implies (11) since P Z ′ = Q. To show that also (12) holds, we use Lemma 3.17 yielding
Since P Z = γ F (ρ), we have
and thus
The entropy of a quantum state can be defined in terms of the entropy of a classical probability distribution. Let ρ be a density operator on a ddimensional Hilbert space H and let (λ 1 , . . . , λ n ) := λ(ρ) be the d-tuple of eigenvalues of ρ. Note that there exists an orthonormal basis {|1 , . . . |d } of ρ (namely the eigenbasis) such that λ i = P (i) where P := γ F (ρ) is the probability distribution of a measurement of ρ with respect to the POVM F = {|1 1|, . . . , |d d }. In particular λ(ρ) can be interpreted as a probability distribution on {1, . . . , d}.
The Rényi entropy (of order α) of a density operator ρ is defined by the Rényi entropy of λ(ρ), i.e., S α (ρ) := H α (λ(ρ)), for α ∈ R + ∪ {∞}. In particular, for α = 1, S(ρ) := S 1 (ρ) is the von Neumann entropy of ρ. Note that, for α = 0, S 0 (ρ) = log(rank(ρ)) .
The notion of smooth Rényi entropy can be defined similarly. The following lemma is a direct consequence of Lemma 3.15 and the fact that the entropy functions −H α are Schur-convex. Lemma 3.20. Let F be an orthogonal POVM on a d-dimensional Hilbert space. Then, for any density operator ρ ∈ S(H) and any α ∈ R + ∪ {∞},
We often will use this result for the case α = 1. To simplify the notation, let
be the Shannon entropy of the outcomes when measuring a density operator ρ ∈ S(H) with respect to a POVM F. If F corresponds to a measurement in an eigenbasis of ρ, we obviously have S(ρ) = S F (ρ), and thus, from Lemma 3.20,
where the minimum is taken over all orthogonal POVMs F in H.
The following lemma is an extension of Lemma 3.20 to smooth Rényi entropy.
Lemma 3.21. Let F be an orthogonal POVM on a Hilbert space H. Then, for any density operator ρ ∈ S(H). Then, for any density operator ρ, α < 1, and ε ≥ 0, S √ 2ε
Proof. From Lemma 3.20, we have
The assertion then follows from Lemma 3.18,
Main Result
This section contains the main result of the paper, namely, the rate for secure quantum key distribution, eq. (22) . In the first part, we derive lemma 4.1 and lemma 4.2. They show that it is possible to estimate the Rényi entropy of order 0 of the outcome of a measurement on almost all subsystems of an n-partite quantum system, by only considering the outcomes of a (different) measurement on the remaining subsystems. In the corollaries that follow, we apply this result to an estimation of the size (rank) of the quantum system (corollary 4.3) and an estimation of the conditional Rényi entropy of order 0 of Alice's string, given Bob's string (corollary 4.5). In section 4.2 and 4.3 we state the important results about information reconciliation, and the security of privacy amplification in the presence of a quantum adversary, respectively.
In section 4.4, we introduce the generic quantum key distribution protocol and prove its security by combining the corollaries mentioned above with the information reconciliation and privacy amplification to obtain our main result, secret key rate in eq. (22).
Parameter Estimation
Lemma 4.1. Let ρ ∈ S(H ⊗n ) be an n-partite state with density range R ⊆ S(H), let F = {F z } z∈Z andF = {F z } z∈Z be two POVMs on H, and let A be a p-random selection on {1, . . . , n}. Let Z A := Γ A F (ρ) and ZĀ := ΓĀ F (ρ) be the outcomes when measuring ρ in H A and HĀ with respect to F andF, respectively. Then, for any ε > 0,
Proof. Let G be the POVM on H obtained by combining F andF with probability p and 1 − p, respectively, i.e., G := {G (z,r) } (z,r)∈(Z∪Z)×{0,1} with G (z,1) := pF z and G (z,0) := (1 − p)F z . Let W := Γ G (ρ) be the n-tuple of outcomes (Z i , R i ) when measuring ρ with respect to G. The random variables occurring in the lemma can then equivalently be defined by A := {i : R i = 1}, Z A := (Z 1 , . . . , Z n ) A , and ZĀ := (Z 1 , . . . , Z n )Ā. The probability range of the n-tuple W is contained in P := γ G (R). We can thus apply Lemma 3.4 forε := ε/2 leading to
Let z ∈ (Z ∪Z) n and a ⊆ {1, . . . , n} such that the n-tuple w of values w i = (z i , χ a (i)) satisfies Q w ∈ Bε(P), i.e.,
for someρ ∈ R. It remains to be shown that this implies
Let (Z, R) and (Z ′ , R ′ ) be two pairs of random variables distributed according to γ G (ρ) and Q w , respectively. It follows from the construction of the POVM G that P R = P bin p , P Z|R=1 = γ F (ρ), and P Z|R=0 = γF (ρ). Moreover, by the definition of the frequency distribution, P Z ′ |R ′ =1 = Q za and P Z ′ |R ′ =0 = Q zā . Hence, using (5),
which implies (16) and thus concludes the proof. Lemma 4.2. Let ρ ∈ S(H ⊗n ) be an n-partite state with density range R ⊆ S(H), let F = {F z } z∈Z andF = {F z } z∈Z be two POVMs on H, let A be a p-random selection on {1, . . . , n}, and let Z A := Γ A F (ρ), ZĀ := ΓĀ F (ρ). Then, for any ε > 0, there exists a real valued function µ with
such that, for any probability distributionQ on Z and any a ⊆ {1, . . . , n},
Proof. Let W be the set of pairs (z, a) consisting of an n-tuple z of elements from Z ∪Z and a subset a ⊆ {1, . . . , n} such that there exists a density operatorρ ∈ R satisfying
For any probability distributionQ on Z and any a ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, let C(Q, a) := {zā : (z, a) ∈ W and Q za =Q} .
We first show that
for anyQ and a. It follows from the definition of the set C(Q, a) that for any z ′ ∈ C(Q, a) there existsρ ∈ R such that δ(Q, γ F (ρ)) ≤ ε/p and δ(Q z ′ , γ G (ρ)) ≤ ε/(1 − p) . which directly implies Q z ′ ∈ B(Q) and thus
Hence, by Definition 3.10, z ′ is contained in the r-typical set T k Z (r) for k := |ā|. By Lemma 3.11 the size of T k Z (r) can not be larger than 2 kr |a| |Z|−1 , from which (17) follows.
Lemma 4.1 gives a lower bound for the probability that (Z, A) is contained in W,
Let the function µ be defined by
.
On the other hand, from Lemma 3.6,
for anyQ and a. Combining this with (17) concludes the proof.
Corollary 4.3. Let ρ ∈ S(H ⊗n ) be an n-partite state with density range R ⊆ S(H), let F = {F z } z∈Z be a POVM on H, letF be an orthogonal POVM on H, and let A be a p-random selection on {1, . . . , n}. Let Z A := Γ A F (ρ) be the outcomes when measuring ρ in H A with respect to F and let ρĀ be the remaining quantum state in HĀ. Then, for any ε > 0, there exists a real valued function µ with
Proof. Since the POVMF = {F z } z∈Z is orthogonal, we have |Z| = dim(H). According to Lemma 4.2, there exists a functionμ satisfying
such that
holds. Let the function µ be defined by µ(Q, a) := 2μ(Q, a). Using Jensen's inequality, we obtain
16 .
On the other hand, sinceF is orthogonal, Lemma 3.21 implies that
for anyQ and a which, together with (18), concludes the proof.
Corollary 4.4. Let Z be a set and let A be a p-random selection on {1, . . . , n}. Then, for any n-tuple Z of random variables with range Z and any ε > 0, there exists a real valued function µ with
Corollary 4.5. Let X and Y be n-tuples of random variables with range X and Y, respectively, and let A be a p-random selection on {1, . . . , n}. Then, for any y ∈ Y n and ε > 0, there exists a real valued function µ with
such that, for any channelQ from Y to X and for any set a ⊆ {1, . . . , n},
Proof. Let Y ′ be the subset of Y containing all values y such that Q y (y) ≥ εn. For any y ∈ Y, let a y := {i : y i = y} , and, for any y ∈ Y ′ , let µ y be the function defined by Corollary 4.4 applied to the tuple X ay . In particular, we have, for y ∈ Y ′ , any probability distributionQ ′ on X , and any a ⊆ {1, . . . , n},
where r y := H max (B ε/p(1−p) (Q)). On the other hand, for y ∈ Y − Y ′ , let
Applying Lemma 3.7 yields
from which the assertion follows.
Information reconciliation
Lemma 4.6. Let Z be a random variable with H ε 0 (Z) ≤ r and let F be a two-universal hash function from Z to {0, 1} s . Then there exists a guessing function d such that
Privacy amplification against quantum adversaries
We will use the following theorem proven in [1] .
Theorem 4.7. Let Z be a random variable with H ε ∞ (Z) ≥ n and let ρ ∈ S(H) be a density operator with S ε ′ 0 (ρ) ≤ r which depends on X. Let F be a two-universal hash function from Z to {0, 1} s and let W := Γ G (ρ) be the outcome of a measurement of ρ with respect to an arbitrary POVM G which might depend on F . Then
A generic quantum key distribution protocol
In this section, we will describe the generic protocol and apply the results from the previous sections to prove its security. To enhance the readability of this exposition, we will restrict our attention to the asymptotic behaviour of the relevant quantities. The exact statements about eventual constants may be taken directly from the lemmas that we refer to. Let ρ be a density operator on (H A ⊗ H B ) ⊗n . Let F and G be two POVMs on H A and let F ′ and G ′ be two POVMs on H B . Let T and T ′ be two p-random selections on {1, . . . , n}. For any i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, let X i be the outcome of a measurement of the subsystem (H A ) i with respect to F, if i ∈ T , or with respect to G, otherwise. Similarly, let Y i be the outcome of a measurement of (H B ) i with respect to F ′ , if i ∈ T ′ , or with respect to G ′ , otherwise. Let S be a p-random selection on T A .
For the following asymptotic analysis, we assume that p = Θ(n −α ) for some α ∈ (0, 1). In particular, pn grows less than linearly in n.
Parameter Estimation
Alice Bob
The functionsQ and R are defined as follows. Let x = (x 1 , . . . , x k ) and y = (y 1 , . . . , y k ) be two k-tuples. ThenQ(x, y) is the frequency distribution Q z of the k-tuple z = ((x 1 , y 1 ) , . . . , (x k , y k )). Similarly, R := R(x, y) is the set of density operators on H A ⊗ H B such that the outcomes of a measurement of anyρ ∈ R with respect to F ⊗ F ′ are distributed according toQ(x, y).
Note that T ∩ T ′ is a p 2 -random selection on {1, . . . , n} and that S ∩ T ′ is a p 2 (1 − p)-random selection on {1, . . . , n}. Corollary 4.4 implies that
holds for ε exponentially small in n. Similarly, Lemma 3.9 implies
Information Reconciliation
Let n ′ := n − |S ∪ T ∪ T ′ | be the length of the tuples X ′ and Y ′ , and let, for some r ′ ≤ n ′ , H r ′ := H(X n ′ → {0, 1} r ′ ) be the set of two-universal hash functions mapping X ′ to r ′ bits.
Alice Bob
It follows from Lemma 4.6 and (19) that for some r ′ = r + o(n) ≤ nH(X|Y ) + o(n), X ′ =X ′ holds except with probability exponentially small in n. Moreover, since F is independent of X ′ and since H 0 (F (X ′ )) = r ′ , Lemma 3.8 together with (20) implies
where C ′ := (F, F (X ′ )) are the messages sent by Alice during the information reconciliation protocol.
Privacy Amplification
Let P be the set of permutations of the n ′ elements of X ′ and for some s ′ ≤ n ′ let H s ′ := H(X n ′ → {0, 1} s ′ ) be a two-universal hash function mapping X ′ to s ′ bits.
Since X ′ = X ′′ holds except with probability exponentially small in n, we have S = S ′ .
It follows from Corollary 4.3 and (21) that for some
is smaller than zero. Theorem 4.7 thus implies that the knowledge of Eve about the key S is negligible. Note that the rate R of this protocol is
Note further that we can carry out the same analysis for the difference
where we condition on additional information W . This might improve the rate R with a clever choice of the information W as we will see in the next section.
Examples
In the following we will illustrate our result by calculating the secret key rate and the tolerable error rates for common quantum key distribution protocols.
BB84 (The four state protocol)
The BB84 quantum key distribution protocol [3] belongs to the class of so-called prepare and measure protocols. In this protocol, Alice chooses randomly, with probability (1−p), the first out of a set of two conjugate bases of a qubit, the second basis is chosen with probability p. She then prepares one of the orthogonal basis states, each chosen with equal probability, and sends the quantum state to Bob. 4 The BB84 protocol can be regarded as an entanglement based protocol and is in this version known as BBM92 [32] . The preparation stage on Alice's side is then given by a measurement on one half of an entangled quantum state whose second part is sent off to Bob. The relevant quantum state ρ is a two qubit state, ρ ∈ S(C 2 ⊗ C 2 ) and we denote measurement basis one by {|0 , |1 } and basis two by {|+ , |− }, where |± := 1 √ 2 (|0 ± |1 ). It is understood that e.g. 01|ρ|01 corresponds to the probability that Alice . A more efficient protocol, which achieves twice the key generation rate of the original proposal, can be obtained by choosing the two bases with different probabilities [31] . We choose p = Θ(n −α ), for α ∈ (0, 1) and n the number of transmitted qubits (see also section 4.4) .
obtains outcome 0 and Bob outcome 1 when both choose to measure in the first basis. We further identify |+ with outcome 0 and |− with outcome 1.
After the phase, where the transmission of the quantum states and the measurements have been finished, both parties publicly announce the bases in which they conducted their measurements. They discard the cases in which they did not measure in the same basis. On a small subset of the remaining data, they compare a small part of the string to obtain an estimate of the error rate. Let us assume that the error rate for measurements in both basis are the same and equal to ǫ. If this is not the case, Alice and Bob can always randomly flip some of the bits of the set with the lower error rate in order to make the error probabilities of both sets equal.
The entropy of Alice's string X equals H(X) = 1 and the conditional entropy of X given Y is given by H(X|Y ) = h(ǫ). The von Neumann entropy of ρ can be estimated as follows. Note that for all projective measurements on ρ with outcome given by a random variable Z, H(Z) ≥ S(ρ). Using Alice's and Bob's data, we want to construct the data that a Bell measurement, saved in the random variable Z had resulted in. Let us define the Bell states
and express the probabilities of Z, denoted by λ i , in terms of the probabilities of measurements in basis one and basis two:
The symmetric error probability ǫ yields 00|ρ|00 + 11|ρ|11 = 1 − ǫ
and can be inserted into eqs. (23)- (26) . We obtain
It remains to find the value of the free parameter λ 4 ∈ [0, ǫ] such that H(Z) is maximised. It can easily be shown that this is the case for λ 4 = ǫ 2 with H(Z) = 2h(ǫ).
The rate R of the protocol according to eq. (22) is given by
The security threshold is the highest value of ǫ such that the rate R is positive and is henceforth the solution to the equation 1 − 3h(ǫ) = 0. We obtain ǫ ≈ 0.061 which corresponds to a 6.1% bit error rate. Conversely, there exists a quantum state ρ for which this rate is achieved and it is given by the mixture
The six state protocol
The 6-state protocol [33, 34] is similar to the BB84 protocol, but makes use of a third basis on either side. This additional basis is defined as {
(|0 − i|1 )} and conjugate to the other bases 5 . This protocol admits higher symmetry, since the six states that are sent are symmetrically distributed on the Bloch sphere. Similarly to the derivation of eqs. (27) - (29), we easily derive the following additional constraint on the eigenvalues λ 3 = ǫ − λ 2 which results in λ 1 = 1 − 3/2ǫ and λ i = ǫ/2 for i ∈ {2, 3, 4} corresponding to a security threshold of 6.8% with corresponding state
5 Note that we can choose bases two and three e.g. with probability Another way to derive this result uses the average fidelityF of a qubit quantum channel. It can be shown [35] to be equal to the average fidelity of the six states. Here, the fidelity of each state equals 1 − ǫ and thereforē F = 1 − ǫ.F and the entanglement fidelity F e are related by the formula F e = 3F −1 2 [36] which also leads to the 6.8% by use of the quantum Fano inequality.
The given bounds for standard BB84 and the six-state protocol on the maximal entropy of ρ are optimal, since Eve can simply prepare the state eq. (30) . Even if we consider Alice preparing the particles and sending them off to Bob, we cannot achieve a better bound. This is because the state eq. (30) can be effected by Eve with the following strategy: apply the Pauli matrix σ z with probability λ 2 (σ y with λ 3 and σ x with λ 4 ) on the sent quantum state and with probability λ 1 take no action.
Making use of the remark at the end of section 4.4.3, we can improve the security threshold for both the standard and the 6-state protocol. To do so, we introduce a random variable W = X ⊕Y , which contains the information about the error positions. The min entropy of the string X does not decrease, whereas the size of the quantum data does, thus improving the key rate R. This can be seen as follows: given the fact that Alice and Bob measured in bases number one/two and that an error/no error and has occurred, the quantum system can be divided into 4 subsystems. The subsystems in the case of one error/no error contain a fraction of The key rate for standard BB84 is thus given by R = 1 − 2h(ǫ) and the security threshold ǫ ≈ 0.1100 is the solution to the equation 1 − 2h(ǫ) = 0. The same rate has previously been obtained by Shor and Preskill [18] . Similarly, we obtain ǫ ≈ 0.1262 for the six-state protocol, which coincides with the result of an earlier calculation by Lo [37] based on a result by Bennett et al. [38] .
Conclusion
In this paper we have present a security proof for a generic quantum key distribution protocol. The protocol requires only single particle measurements on Alice's and Bob's sides and uses one-way information reconciliation and privacy amplification to extract a secret key from the raw data. In our proof we estimate the amount of classical correlation contained in Alice's and Bob's data and derive a bound on the quantum information, which a possible adversary might have about this data. Subsequently, we apply a recent result by König, Maurer and Renner [1] to ensure the security of the privacy amplification stage. Special cases of our protocol include entanglement based quantum key distribution, such as E91, and prepare and measure schemes, such as BB84 or the six state protocol. We were able to derive security thresholds of 11.0% bit error rate for standard BB84 and 12.6%, previously obtained by Preskill and Shor, and Lo, respectively.
